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Abstract
In this paper we present a model for games with perfect information in which the players,
upon observing an unexpected move, may revise their beliefs about the opponents’ prefer-
ences over outcomes. For a given profile P of preference relations over outcomes, we impose
the following three principles: (1) players initially believe that opponents have preference
relations as specified by P ; (2) players believe at every instance of the game that each op-
ponent is carrying out an optimal strategy; and (3) beliefs about the opponents’ preference
relations over outcomes should be revised in a minimal way. It is shown that every player
whose preference relation is given by P, and who throughout the game respects common
belief in the events (1), (2) and (3), has a unique optimal strategy, namely his backward in-
duction strategy in the game induced by P.We finally show that replacing the minimal belief
revision principle (3) by the more modest requirement of Bayesian updating leads exactly to
the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure in the game induced by P.
Keywords: Belief revision, minimal belief change, backward induction, dynamic games.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: C72
1. Introduction
In this paper we are concerned with the problem of how to model rationality in dynamic games.
In a purely static setting, rational choice can be formalized by the requirement that players hold
beliefs about the opponents’ strategy choices, and choose strategies that are optimal against
these beliefs. In a dynamic game, however, it may happen that a player’s initial belief about the
opponents’ strategy choices will be contradicted by the opponents’ real behavior later on in the
game. At this instance, the player must revise his belief about the opponents as to explain the
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observed behavior. The two basic questions that we shall focus on are: How should the player
revise his beliefs? and What consequences does this have for the player’s own behavior?
As to illustrate the problem of belief revision, consider the game tree depicted in Figure
1. The symbols A,B,C and D denote the diﬀerent outcomes, or terminal nodes, that can be
reached at the end. Suppose that player 2 holds preference relation DBCA over these outcomes,
meaning that he strictly prefers D over B, strictly prefers B over C, and strictly prefers C over
A. Assume, moreover, that (1) player 2 initially believes that player 1 has preference relation
CADB over outcomes, and (2) that player 2 initially believes that player 1 initially believes that
player 2 will choose c. If player 2 believes, moreover, that player 1 chooses optimally given this
initial belief and preference relation, he must believe at the beginning of the game that player 1
chooses a.
Suppose now that player 2 observes that player 1 has chosen action b. In this case, he must
conclude that his initial belief about player 1 was wrong, and therefore needs to be replaced
by a new belief that explains the event of player 1 choosing b. A possible explanation could be
that player 2’s initial belief about player 1’s preference relation and initial belief were correct,
but that player 1 has mistakenly chosen b. Although mistakes can never be ruled out in human
decision making, we adopt as a guiding principle for our approach that players, at every possible
instance of the game, believe that each of the opponents is carrying out an optimal strategy.
That is, if a player observes an opponent’s move that contradicts his current belief about the
opponent, then he deems the event that the opponent has acted rationally more plausible than
the event that the opponent has made a mistake. We shall refer to this principle as belief in
sequential rationality.
As a consequence of this principle, player 2, upon observing b, must either revise his belief
about player 1’s preference relation, or revise his belief about player 1’s initial belief about player
2’s strategy choice, since otherwise the move b cannot be rationalized. A problem that arises
here is that player 2 may choose between various belief revision procedures that rationalize the
move b, and these diﬀerent belief revision procedures may lead to diﬀerent choices for player 2.
For instance, player 2 may explain the move b by the new theory that player 1 still has preference
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relation CADB, but that player 1 initially believes that player 2 will choose d (and not c, as
player 2 believed initially). In this case, player 2 believes upon observing b that player 1 would
choose e at his final decision node, and hence player 2 will choose c when adopting this belief
revision procedure. Another possibility for player 2 would be to believe, upon observing b, that
player 1 has preference relationDCBA (instead of CADB, as player 2 believed initially), without
revising his belief about player 1’s initial belief about player 2’s strategy choice. Accordingly,
player 2 believes that player 1 would choose f at his final decision node, and hence player 2 will
choose d when using this second belief revision procedure.
This phenomenon raises the question whether the various belief revision procedures that
player 2 may adopt can be classified according to some natural criterion. A generally accepted
principle in belief revision theory is that belief changes should be as small as possible, while being
able to explain the newly observed information (see Schulte (2002) for an excellent discussion
of the idea of minimal belief revision, and an overview of the various formalizations thereof in
belief revision theory). The intuition behind this principle is that the current beliefs of a decision
maker reflect, in some sense, the “best possible theory” that he can produce about the state of
aﬀairs given his current information. If these beliefs are contradicted by new observations, the
decision maker therefore attempts to explain these new events by disturbing his previous beliefs
as little as possible.
When applying the minimal belief revision principle to our example, it may seem, at first
glance, that both belief revisions above are “equally” distant from the initial belief, as they both
require one belief change: in the first belief revision, player 2 changes his belief about player 1’s
initial belief about player 2’s choice, while leaving his belief about player 1’s preference relation
invariant, whereas in the second revision player 2 changes his belief about player 1’s preference
relation, while maintaining his belief about player 1’s initial belief about player 2’s choice. The
problem with this argument is that the aforementioned description of player 2’s beliefs only
reveals a small part of the complete beliefs: player 2 does not only hold a belief about player 1’s
preference relation and about player 1’s belief about player 2’s strategy choice, but also about
player 1’s belief about player 2’s preference relation, and about player 1’s belief about player 2’s
belief about player 1’s strategy choice, and so forth. Consequently, if player 2, in the first belief
revision, changes his belief about player 1’s initial belief about player 2’s strategy choice from
c to d, then player 2 must rationalize this belief change by changing, in addition, (1) his belief
about player 1’s initial belief about player 2’s preference relation, or (2) his belief about player
1’s initial belief about player 2’s belief about player 1’s choice. Namely, if player 2 initially
believes that player 1 initially believes that player 2 chooses c, and player 2 moreover believes
that player 1 believes in sequential rationality, as we have imposed above, then player 2 must
initially believe that (1) player 1’s initial belief about player 2’s preference relation, together
with (2) player 1’s initial belief about player 2’s belief about player 1’s strategy choice, are such
that player 1 deems c optimal for player 2. Therefore, if player 2, in the first belief revision,
changes his theory by believing that player 1 initially believes that player 2 chooses d, then this
must be justified by adapting the belief about player 1’s initial belief about player 2’s preference
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relation and/or about player 2’s belief about player 1’s strategy choice. The bottomline is thus
that the first belief revision requires, apart from the change in belief about player 1’s initial
belief about player 2’s strategy choice, at least one more belief change. On the other hand, in
the second belief revision player 2 changes his belief about player 1’s preference relation, and
this belief change alone is already suﬃcient to explain the move b by player 1. In other words,
it is not necessary to complement this belief change about player 1’s preference relation by an
additional belief change concerning player 1. We may therefore conclude that the first belief
revision requires more belief changes than the second, and the first belief revision should thus
be discarded on the basis of minimal belief revision.
Since it is always possible to explain every unexpected opponent’s move by a revision about
the opponent’s preference relation alone, the argument above implies that the principle of min-
imal belief revision always leads to belief revisions that concern only the opponent’s preference
relation, and not the opponent’s belief about the other players’ strategy choices. The reason, as
we have seen above, is that revisions about opponent i’s belief about player j’s strategy choice
must always be rationalized by a belief change about player i’s belief about player j’s prefer-
ence relation or belief. The first minimal belief revision principle we adopt states therefore that
players, when revising their beliefs about the opponents upon observing an unexpected move,
should only revise their beliefs about the opponents’ preference relations, and leave the other
components of their beliefs unaltered.
An important implicit assumption we make when applying this first minimal belief revision
principle is that all beliefs of any order are viewed as “equally important”. That is, the belief
that player i has about player j’s strategy choice is considered “as important” as player i’s belief
about player j’s belief about the other players’ strategy choices. This assumption seems natural
once we impose common belief in sequential rationality, as we shall do in our model, since in this
case player i’s belief about player j’s belief about his opponents’ strategies serves as a justification
for player i’s belief about player j’s strategy choice. Common belief in sequential rationality
implies, namely, that player i should believe that player j’s strategy choice is optimal given
player i’s belief about player j’s preference relation, and given player i’s belief about player j’s
conditional beliefs about the opponents’ strategy choices. Hence, player i’s second order beliefs
justify player i’s first order beliefs about the opponents’ strategy choices, and therefore both
beliefs may be viewed as “equally important ”. Similarly, common belief in sequential rationality
implies that player i’s k-th order beliefs justify his (k− 1)-th order beliefs about the opponents’
strategy choices for any k. For this reason, we assume that beliefs of all possible orders are
viewed as “equally important” in our model, thereby justifying the first minimal belief revision
principle formulated above.
The question remains whether the second belief revision described above, in which player 2
changes his belief about player 1’s preference relation from CADB to DCBA, may be regarded
a minimal belief revision. As to answer this question, compare this belief revision with a third
belief revision defined as follows: upon observing move b, player 2 believes that player 1’s
preference relation is CDBA, while leaving his other beliefs about player 1 invariant. Also this
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belief revision procedure rationalizes the move b by player 1, and according to this new belief,
player 2 expects player 1 to choose e at his final decision node, which leads to choice c for
player 2 (and not d, as with the second belief revision). We argue that the third belief revision
is smaller than the second, as the revised belief CDBA about player 1’s preference relation is
“closer” to the initial belief CADB than DCBA.
As to formalize what we mean by “closer”, we measure the distance between two preference
relations by counting the pairs of outcomes on which the two relations induce diﬀerent pairwise
rankings. For instance, CADB and DCBA induce diﬀerent rankings on {A,B}, {A,D} and
{C,D}, and therefore the distance between both is 3. On the other hand, CADB and CDBA
disagree solely on {A,B} and {A,D}, meaning that the distance is only 2. Consequently, the
second belief revision represents a larger belief change than the third. According to the minimal
belief revision principle, the second belief revision should thus be discarded. As a second minimal
belief revision principle we therefore require that players, when revising their belief about an
opponent’s preference relation, should make sure that their new belief is as close as possible to
the previous belief, given the distance measure formalized above, provided that the new belief
should rationalize the newly observed move(s) by this opponent.
Note that in the distance measure mentioned above, player i attaches equal weight to each
pairwise ranking that player j could possibly have over outcomes. As such, it is implicitly
assumed that player i is equally certain (or uncertain, if you wish) about player j’s various
pairwise rankings of outcomes. Of course, there are many practical examples that violate this
condition, as some pairwise rankings seem intuitively less ambiguous than others, and hence
belief revisions about such “less ambiguous” pairwise rankings should have a larger weight
than belief revisions about “more ambiguous” pairwise rankings. The distance measure used
above also assumes that there is no “correlation” between the various outcomes of the game.
More precisely, it is assumed that a belief revision about an opponent’s pairwise ranking of two
outcomes A and B should not be a reason per se´ to change your belief about the opponent’s
ranking of two other outcomes C and D. This condition may be violated in practical examples
in which, intuitively, some outcomes are similar to each other. Assume, for instance, that in
the example of Figure 1 it were the case that outcome A is similar to outcome C, and outcome
B is similar to outcome D. As above, suppose that player 2 initially believes that player 1 has
preference relation CADB. Then, player 2’s second belief revision in which, upon observing b,
he believes that player 1 has preference relation DCBA should now be regarded a smaller belief
change than player 2’s third belief revision, in which he believes, upon observing b, that player
1 has preference relation CDBA. The reason is that the third belief revision contradicts the
similarities of the outcomes: if player 2 believes that player 1 prefers B over A, he should also
believe that player 1 prefers D over C. However, for the remainder of this paper we shall assume
that players are equally certain about each of the opponents’ pairwise rankings, and that there
is no correlation between outcomes, and hence the distance measure introduced above makes
intuitive sense.
The obvious question is now whether the third belief revision, in which player 2 changes his
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belief about player 1’s preference relation from CADB to CDBA, is a minimal belief change.
The answer must be “yes”. Recall that player 2 initially believes that player 1 initially believes
that player 2 chooses c. Hence, if player 2 changes his belief about player 1’s preference relation
upon observing move b, he must make sure that the new belief ranks outcome B over outcome
A. However, it can be seen easily that this requires at least a distance of 2 with respect to the
initial belief CADB, and therefore the third belief revision has minimal distance.
Although there are several minimal belief revisions for player 2 in this example, it may be
verified that every minimal belief revision has the property that player 2, upon observing move
b, still believes that player 1 prefers outcome C over outcome D (as player 2 believed initially).
The intuition is that, in order to explain the unexpected move b by player 1, it is not necessary
to change the belief about player 1’s relative ranking of C and D, and hence, by minimal belief
revision, player 2 should not do so. But if this is true, minimal belief revision always leads player
2 to believe, upon observing b, that player 1 would choose e at his final decision node, and hence
player 2 will always choose c when acting in accordance with minimal belief revision.
Note that strategy c is the exactly the backward induction strategy for player 2 in the game
where the players’ preferences over outcomes are given by P1 = CADB and P2 = DBCA,
respectively. By putting P = (P1, P2), we have thus derived the following result for this example:
If player 2 has preference relation P2, initially believes that player 1 has preference relation P1,
believes in sequential rationality and satisfies minimal belief revision, then there is a unique
optimal strategy for player 2, namely his backward induction strategy in the game induced by
P.
Our main theorem in this paper (Theorem 5.2) shows that a similar result is true for general
games with perfect information. Consider a profile P = (Pi)i∈I of strict preference relations
over outcomes, where Pi belongs to player i. If player i holds preference relation Pi, and re-
spects common belief in the events that (1) players initially believe that their opponents have
preference relations as given by P, (2) players believe in sequential rationality, and (3) players
satisfy minimal belief revision, then player i has a unique optimal strategy, namely his backward
induction strategy in the game induced by P. Here, we say that player i respects common belief
in the event that players have a certain property if player i has this property, player i believes
throughout the game that all players have this property, player i believes throughout the game
that other players believe throughout the game that all players have this property, and so on.
The concepts of (common belief in) belief in sequential rationality and minimal belief revision
may thus be viewed as a possible foundation for backward induction, which constitutes one of
the oldest ideas in game theory. The main diﬀerence with other foundations for backward
induction, such as Aumann (1995), Samet (1996), Balkenborg and Winter (1997), Stalnaker
(1998), Asheim (2002) and Asheim and Perea (2004), is that in our model, players are assumed
to interpret every unexpected move by an opponent as a rational move, whereas this is not the
case in the latter foundations. Moreover, in our model players are allowed to revise their beliefs
about the opponents’ preference relations over outcomes in order to rationalize such unexpected
moves, while the aforementioned foundations do not model this possibility, at least not explicitly.
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Other foundations for backward induction that do allow players to revise their beliefs about the
opponents’ utilities during the game can be found in Perea (2003a, 2003b). The main diﬀerence
with our approach here is that the latter two foundations use proper belief revision, rather than
minimal belief revision, as a criterion to restrict the possible belief revision procedures. Proper
belief revision states that whenever player i at decision node hi revises his belief about player
j, then he must not change his belief about player j’s relative ranking of two strategies sj and
s0j , if both sj and s
0
j could have led to hi. The intuition is that such belief changes would be
“unnecessary ” in order to explain the event that hi has been reached. In Section 4.2 we establish
a formal relationship between minimal belief revision and proper belief revision, which proves
to be important for deriving the announced theorem on backward induction.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we develop an epistemic model for games
with perfect information that allows us to formalize statements such as “player i believes at
decision node hi that player j has preference relation Pj ”, or “player i believes at decision node
hi that player j believes at decision node hj that player k chooses strategy sk”, and so on. In
this model, the relevant characteristics of a player are represented by a so-called type, defining
a preference relation over outcomes and prescribing at every decision node a conditional belief
about the opponents’ strategy choices and types. Since types hold conditional beliefs about the
opponents’ types, they therefore also hold conditional beliefs about the opponents’ preference
relations, and about the opponents’ conditional beliefs about the other players’ strategy choices,
and so forth. We then use this model to define the notion of common belief. In Section 3 we
formalize what it means that a type “believes in sequential rationality”, “satisfies minimal belief
revision” and “initially believes in some profile P of preference relations”. In Section 4 we derive
some properties of minimal belief revision and belief in sequential rationality that are important
for establishing our theorem on backward induction. In Section 5 we first show that for every
profile P = (Pi)i∈I of preference relations, and every player i, there is at least one type for player
i that respects common belief in the events that types (1) believe in sequential rationality, (2)
satisfy minimal belief revision, and (3) initially believe that types hold preference relations
as specified by P. We therefore guarantee that common belief in these three events is always
possible. We then show that every player i type that holds preference relation Pi, and respects
common belief in the three events above, has a unique optimal strategy, namely his backward
induction strategy in the game induced by P. In Section 6, finally, we explore the consequences
of replacing the minimal belief revision principle by the more modest requirement of Bayesian
updating. It is shown that the resulting concept allows for any strategy that survives the Dekel-
Fudenberg procedure in the game induced by P. Here, by the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure we
mean one round of elimination of weakly dominated strategies, followed by iterative elimination
of strongly dominated strategies in the game induced by P. Hence, common belief in minimal
belief revision may be seen as a property that closes the gap between the Dekel-Fudenberg
procedure and the concept of backward induction.
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2. The Epistemic Model
2.1. Games with Perfect Information
A dynamic game is said to be with perfect information if every player, at each instance of the
game, observes the opponents’ moves that have been made until then. Formally, an extensive
form structure S with perfect information consists of a finite game tree, a finite set I of players,
for every player i a finite set Hi of decision nodes, for every decision node hi ∈ Hi a finite set
A(hi) of available actions, and a finite set Z of terminal nodes. Perfect information is modeled by
the assumption that each decision node by itself constitutes an information set. By A we denote
the set of all actions, whereas H denotes the collection of all decision nodes. We assume that
no chance moves occur. The definition of a strategy we shall employ coincides with the concept
of a plan of action, as discussed in Rubinstein (1991). The diﬀerence with the usual definition
is that we require a strategy only to prescribe an action at those decision nodes that the same
strategy does not avoid. Formally, let H˜i ⊆ Hi be a collection of player i decision nodes, not
necessarily containing all decision nodes, and let si : H˜i → A be a mapping prescribing at every
hi ∈ H˜i some available action si(hi) ∈ A(hi). For a given decision node h ∈ H, not necessarily
belonging to player i, we say that si avoids h if there is some hi ∈ H˜i on the path to h at which
the prescibed action si(hi) deviates from the path to h. Such a mapping si : H˜i → A is called
a strategy for player i if H˜i is exactly the collection of player i decision nodes not avoided by
si. Obviously, every strategy si can be obtained by first prescribing an action at all player i
decision nodes, that is, constructing a strategy in the classical sense, and then deleting those
player i decision nodes that are avoided by it. For a given strategy si ∈ Si, we denote by Hi(si)
the collection of player i decision nodes that are not avoided by si. Let Si be the set of player i
strategies. For a given decision node h ∈ H and player i, we denote by Si(h) the set of player
i strategies that do not avoid h. Then, it is clear that a profile (si)i∈I of strategies reaches a
decision node h if and only if si ∈ Si(h) for all players i.
2.2. Types
We shall now formally model the players in the extensive form structure S as decision makers
under uncertainty. Our primary assumption is that every player i holds a strict, complete and
transitive preference relation Pi over the set of terminal nodes, and holds at the beginning of
the game, as well as at every decision node hi ∈ Hi, a conditional belief about the opponents’
strategy choices. Throughout this paper, whenever we write “preference relation over terminal
nodes”, we always assume that it is strict, complete and transitive. In order to keep the model as
simple as possible, we assume that the conditional beliefs about the opponents’ strategy choices
assign at each instance of the game probability one to a single strategy choice for each of the
opponents, that is, we restrict ourselves to point-beliefs.1 On top of this we assume that every
1This assumption may be justified by the following property of games with perfect information: if a strategy
si is optimal for player i given a probabilistic belief µi over the opponents’ strategies, then there is some single
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player, throughout the game, holds a conditional point-belief about the opponents’ preference
relations over the terminal nodes, and about the opponents’ conditional beliefs about the other
players’ strategy choices. Moreover, each player also holds, at every instance, a conditional
point-belief about the opponents’ conditional beliefs concerning the other players’ preferences
and concerning the other players’ conditional beliefs about their opponents’ strategy choices,
and so on. Repeating this argument inevitably leads to infinite hierarchies of conditional beliefs.
Similarly to Ben-Porath (1997), Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999) and Perea (2004), we model
such hierarchies of conditional beliefs by means of epistemic types. Let h0 be the decision node
that marks the beginning of the game, and let H∗i = Hi ∪ {h0}. By applying techniques from
Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999) and Perea (2004), one can construct type spaces Ti for every
player i such that every type ti ∈ Ti can be identified with a vector
(Pi(ti), (sj(ti, hi), tj(ti, hi))hi∈H∗i ,j 6=i), (2.1)
where Pi(ti) is a preference relation on the set of terminal nodes, sj(ti, hi) is a strategy in Sj(hi)
and tj(ti, hi) is a type in Tj . The interpretation is that ti holds preference relation Pi(ti), and
believes at every decision node hi that player j chooses the strategy sj(ti, hi) and is of type
tj(ti, hi). Since such tj , in turn, holds a preference relation over the terminal nodes and a con-
ditional belief about the other players’ strategy choices, every type ti holds at every instance
a conditional belief about player j’s preference relation and about player j’s conditional beliefs
about the other players’ strategy choices. In a similar fashion, one may derive from (2.1) con-
ditional beliefs about conditional beliefs about ... about conditional beliefs, of arbitrary length.
In the sequel of this paper, we often write s−i(ti, hi) = (sj(ti, hi))j 6=i to denote ti’s conditional
belief at hi about the opponents’ strategy choices, and denote by t−i(ti, hi) = (tj(ti, hi))j 6=i the
conditional belief of ti at hi about the opponents’ types.
2.3. Common Belief
By T = ∪i∈ITi we denote the collection of all types for all players. Let E ⊆ T be some subset
of types, and let ti be a specific type for player i. We say that ti believes E if tj(ti, hi) ∈ E for
every opponent j and every hi ∈ H∗i . In words, ti believes at every instance of the game that
the opponents’ types belong to E. We recursively define
B1(E) = {t ∈ E | t believes E}
and
Bk(E) = {t ∈ Bk−1(E) | t believes Bk−1(E)}
strategy profile within the support of µi against which si is optimal. (Ben-Porath (1997) shows this fact in his
proof of Lemma 1.2.1). Hence, every strategy choice in a game with perfect information that is justified by a
probabilistic belief, can also be justified by a point-belief.
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for all k ≥ 2. Let B∞(E) = ∩k∈NBk(E). We say that ti respects common belief in E if t ∈
B∞(E). Hence, ti belongs to E, believes at every instance that all opponents’ types belong to
E, believes at every instance that all opponents’ types believe at every instance that all other
players’ types belong to E, and so on.
3. Belief in Sequential Rationality and Minimal Belief Revision
In this section we formalize the following three conditions: (1) a type should believe, throughout
the game, that his opponents choose optimal strategies, (2) a type should revise his belief about
an opponent’s characteristics in a minimal way, and (3) a type should initially believe that
the opponents’ preference relations are given by some profile P = (Pi)i∈I . We shall refer to
these conditions as belief in sequential rationality, minimal belief revision and initial belief in P ,
respectively.
3.1. Belief in Sequential Rationality
Let (si, ti) be a pair consisting of a strategy and a type for player i. Recall thatHi(si) is the set of
player i decision nodes that are not avoided by si. For a given hi ∈ Hi(si), let z(si, ti, hi) denote
the terminal node that is reached if the game would start at hi, player i would choose according
to si, and the opponents would choose according to the conditional belief s−i(ti, hi) that ti holds
at hi about the opponents’ strategy choices. We say that si is sequentially rational for ti if
for every decision node hi ∈ Hi(si) there is no strategy s0i ∈ Si(hi) such that ti strictly prefers
the terminal node z(s0i, ti, hi) over the terminal node z(si, ti, hi) with respect to his preference
relation Pi(ti).
Definition 3.1. We say that type ti believes in sequential rationality if at every hi ∈ H∗i , and
for every opponent j, the conditional belief (sj(ti, hi), tj(ti, hi)) about player j’s strategy-type
pair is such that sj(ti, hi) is sequentially rational for tj(ti, hi).
At this stage it is important to note that not every type has a sequentially rational strategy.
Consider, for instance, the extensive form structure in Figure 2. Take a type t1 for player 1
with the preference relation ECDBA over the terminal nodes. Let player 1’s decision nodes
be denoted by h11 and h
2
1, respectively. Suppose that t1 believes at h
1
1 that player 2 chooses
the strategy (d, g), but believes at h21 that player 2 chooses (d, h). The unique strategy that is
optimal for t1 at h
1
1 is (b, e). However, (b, e) is not optimal for t1 at h
2
1, which implies that t1
has no sequentially rational strategy. In Section 4 we shall prove that minimal belief revision
and belief in sequential rationality are suﬃcient to imply that a type has a sequentially rational
strategy. Note also that a type ti can have at most one sequentially rational strategy.
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3.2. Minimal Belief Revision
Suppose now that a type ti observes that decision node hi ∈ Hi has been reached, but cannot
rationalize this event by means of his previous beliefs about player j. In this case, type ti may be
led to revise his belief about (1) player j’s preference relation, or (2) player j’s conditional beliefs
about the other players’ strategy choices, or both. As we have argued already in the introduction,
a belief revision about player j’s conditional beliefs about the other players’ strategy choices
must always be justified by an additional belief revision about player j’s conditional beliefs
about the other players’ preferences and/or conditional beliefs. On the other hand, a belief
revision about player j’s preference relation need not be rationalized by an additional belief
change. For this reason, the principle of minimal belief revision requires players to explain
unexpected moves solely by belief revisions about the opponents’ preference relations. Formally,
let h1i and h
2
i be two decision nodes for player i such that h
2
i follows h
1
i , and let tj(ti, h
1
i ) and
tj(ti, h
2
i ) be ti’s conditional beliefs at h
1
i and h
2
i about player j’s type. For a player j type
tj and preference relation Pj , we denote by (tj , Pj) the type that has preference relation Pj
and holds the same conditional beliefs about the opponents’ strategy-type pairs as tj . Minimal
belief revision requires that tj(ti, h
1
i ) and tj(ti, h
2
i ) diﬀer only by their preference relation, that
is, tj(ti, h
2
i ) = (tj(ti, h
1
i ), Pj) for some preference relation Pj . This requirement is formalized as
condition (1) in the definition of minimal belief revision below.
The additional requirement we impose is that player i’s belief revision about player j’s
preferences must be as small as possible. More precisely, we shall introduce a distance measure
between preference relations, and require that ti’s new belief about player j’s preference relation
should be as close as possible to his old belief, given that the new belief should rationalize the
event of reaching the decision node hi.
Definition 3.2. Let P 1 and P 2 be two preference relations on the set of terminal nodes Z. We
define the distance d(P 1, P 2) as the number of unordered pairs {z1, z2} in Z at which P 1 and
P 2 disagree.
Here, we say that P 1 and P 2 disagree at {z1, z2} if P 1 ranks z1 strictly above z2 but P 2
does not, or P 1 ranks z1 strictly below z2 but P
2 does not. The distance measure thus defined
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coincides with the measure adopted in Ha and Haddawy (1998), and may be interpreted as a
Hamming distance between preference relations, when the latter are interpreted as collections
of pairwise rankings.
For a decision node hi ∈ Hi and type tj ∈ Tj , we say that tj rationalizes the event of reaching
hi if tj has a sequentially rational strategy belonging to Sj(hi). The conditions (2) and (3) in
the definition of minimal belief revision below state that type ti, upon reaching decision node
hi, should change his belief about player j’s preference relation in a minimal way, provided that
his new belief about player j’s type rationalizes the event of reaching hi.
We are now ready to define minimal belief revision. Let ti be a type and let h
1
i , h
2
i ∈ H∗i
such that h2i follows h
1
i and no other hi ∈ Hi lies between h1i and h2i .
Definition 3.3. We say that ti satisfies minimal belief revision at h
2
i if for every opponent j
there is some preference relation P 2j such that
(1) tj(ti, h
2
i ) = (tj(ti, h
1
i ), P
2
j ),
(2) tj(ti, h
2
i ) rationalizes the event of reaching h
2
i , and
(3) there is no other preference relation P˜ 2j such that (tj(ti, h
1
i ), P˜
2
j ) rationalizes the event of
reaching h2i , and d(Pj(tj(ti, h
1
i )), P˜
2
j ) < d(Pj(tj(ti, h
1
i )), P
2
j ).
We finally say that ti satisfies minimal belief revision if it does so at every decision node h
2
i .
3.3. Initial Belief in P
Let P = (Pi)i∈I be some profile of preference relations.
Definition 3.4. We say that type ti initially believes in P if Pj(tj(ti, h0)) = Pj for all opponents
j.
Here, tj(ti, h0) is ti’s initial belief about player j’s type, and Pj(tj(ti, h0)) thus reflects ti’s
initial belief about player j’s preference relation. Note, however, that ti may change his belief
about j’s preference relation if the game moves from h0 to some other decision node hi.
4. Properties of Minimal Belief Revision
As a preparatory step towards our backward induction theorem, we first derive some properties
of minimal belief revision that will be applied in Section 5 for showing the announced relationship
with backward induction.
4.1. Existence of Sequentially Rational Strategies
In the example of Figure 1 we have seen that not every type has a sequentially rational strategy.
Namely, if the type t1 believes at his first decision node h
1
1 that player 2 chooses (d, g), but
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believes at his second decision node h21 that player 2 chooses (d, h), then t1 has no sequentially
rational strategy. The reason for this is that t1’s conditional beliefs at h
2
1 contradict Bayesian
updating: t1’s beliefs at h
1
1 about player 2’s behavior are compatible with the event of reaching
h21, and therefore Bayesian updating implies that t1’s beliefs at h
2
1 should coincide with his beliefs
at h11.
We shall now provide a formalization of the above mentioned Bayesian updating requirement
and show in Lemma 4.2 that it guarantees the existence of a sequentially rational strategy. Let
h1i and h
2
i be two decision nodes in H
∗
i such that h
2
i follows h
1
i , and there is no player i decision
node between h1i and h
2
i .
Definition 4.1. We say that ti satisfies Bayesian updating at h
2
i if for every opponent j for
which sj(ti, h
1
i ) ∈ Sj(h2i ), it holds that sj(ti, h2i ) = sj(ti, h1i ).
In other words, if ti’s belief at h
1
i about player j’s strategy choice does not contradict the
event of reaching h2i , then ti should maintain at h
2
i his previous belief about player j’s strategy
choice. We say that ti satisfies Bayesian updating if it does so at every decision node.
Lemma 4.2. Every type that satisfies Bayesian updating has a sequentially rational strategy.
The proof of this lemma is based on Theorem 3.1 in Perea (2002). The ‘if’ part of this
theorem states that if an “updating system” satisfies “updating consistency”, then every “locally
sequentially rational” strategy is sequentially rational. In order to state the ‘if ’ part of this
theorem more precisely, we must first formally define the terms “updating system”, “updating
consistency” and “locally sequentially rational strategy”. As to simplify matters we shall define
these objects directly within our special context of games with perfect information, and restrict
ourselves to “updating systems” that always assign probability one to one particular strategy
choice for every opponent. The reason for the latter is that the conditional belief vectors in
our epistemic model always assign probability one to one particular strategy choice for each
opponent.
An updating system for player i is a vector ci = (ci(hi))hi∈Hi where ci(hi) ∈ S−i(hi) for every
decision node hi ∈ Hi. Here, S−i(hi) = ×j 6=iSj(hi), and ci(hi) represents player i’s conditional
belief at hi about the opponents’ strategy choices. For a given decision node hi and conditional
beliefs ci(hi), c
0
i(hi) ∈ S−i(hi), we say that ci(hi) and c0i(hi) are equivalent at hi if for every
strategy si ∈ Si(hi) it holds that the strategy profiles (si, ci(hi)) and (si, c0i(hi)) lead to the same
terminal node. Hence, ci(hi) and c
0
i(hi) only diﬀer at decision nodes that do not precede nor
follow hi. The updating system ci is called updating consistent if for every two decision nodes h
1
i
and h2i where h
1
i precedes h
2
i and ci(h
1
i ) ∈ S−i(h2i ), it holds that ci(h2i ) and ci(h1i ) are equivalent
at h2i . An extended strategy for player i is a vector s˜i = (s˜i(hi))hi∈Hi where s˜i(hi) ∈ A(hi) for
every decision node hi. The diﬀerence with a strategy as defined in this paper is thus that an
extended strategy also prescribes actions at decision nodes that are avoided by it, whereas a
strategy does not. An extended strategy s˜i is called locally sequentially rational with respect to
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an updating system ci and a preference relation Pi over the terminal nodes if at every decision
node hi the action s˜i(hi) is optimal against the actions prescribed by ci(hi) and s˜i in the subgame
that follows hi. We say that a (non-extended) strategy si is locally sequentially rational with
respect to ci and Pi if there is an extended strategy s˜i such that s˜i is locally sequentially rational
with respect to ci and Pi, and s˜i coincides with si at decision nodes in Hi(si). Finally, a strategy
si is called sequentially rational with respect to ci and Pi if at every decision node hi ∈ Hi(si)
there is no other strategy s0i ∈ Si(hi) such that the terminal node reached by s0i and ci(hi) is
strictly preferred by Pi over the terminal node reached by si and ci(hi). The ‘if’ part of Theorem
3.1 in Perea (2002), when applied to our specific context, can now be stated as follows.
Lemma 4.3. Let ci be an updating system that is updating consistent, and let Pi be a preference
relation over the terminal nodes. Then, every strategy that is locally sequentially rational with
respect to ci and Pi is also sequentially rational with respect to ci and Pi.
We are now ready to prove Lemma 4.2.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. Let ti be a type with preference relation Pi that satisfies Bayesian
updating. We show that ti has a sequentially rational strategy. For every decision node hi ∈ Hi
define ci(hi) = s−i(ti, hi)), which is an element in S−i(hi). Hence, the vector ci = (ci(hi))hi∈Hi
is an updating system. Since ti satisfies Bayesian updating, it immediately follows that the
updating system ci is updating consistent. By Lemma 4.3 we then know that every locally
sequentially rational strategy with respect to ci and Pi is sequentially rational with respect to
ci and Pi. Since it is clear that every sequentially rational strategy with respect to ci and Pi is
also sequentially rational for ti, it suﬃces to show that there is a locally sequentially rational
strategy with respect to ci and Pi.
By a simple backward induction procedure, one can define for every player i decision node
hi ∈ Hi some action a(hi) such that every action a(hi) is optimal with respect to Pi against (1)
the actions prescribed by ci(hi) at the opponents’ decision nodes following hi, and (2) his own
actions a(h0i) at decision nodes h
0
i ∈ Hi following hi. Then, by construction of the actions a(hi),
the extended strategy s˜i = (a(hi))hi∈Hi is locally sequentially rational with respect to ci and Pi.
Let si be the unique strategy that coincides with s˜i at all decision nodes in Hi(si). Hence, si is
locally sequentially rational with respect to ci and Pi. As we have seen above, this implies that
si is sequentially rational with respect to ci and Pi. But then, si is sequentially rational for ti.
This completes the proof of this lemma. ¥
We shall now prove that minimal belief revision and belief in sequential rationality lead to
Bayesian updating.
Lemma 4.4. Let ti be a type that believes in sequential rationality and satisfies minimal belief
revision. Then, ti satisfies Bayesian updating.
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Proof. Choose a type ti that believes in sequential rationality and satisfies minimal belief
revision. Let h1i , h
2
i be two decision nodes in H
∗
i such that h
2
i follows h
1
i , and no player i decision
node is between h1i and h
2
i . Let j be an opponent for which sj(ti, h
1
i ) belongs to Sj(h
2
i ). As ti
believes in sequential rationality, it must be the case that sj(ti, h
1
i ) is sequentially rational for
type tj(ti, h
1
i ). The fact that sj(ti, h
1
i ) ∈ Sj(h2i ) then implies that the type tj(ti, h1i ) itself already
rationalizes the event of reaching h2i . By minimal belief revision, it must therefore be the case
that tj(ti, h
2
i ) = tj(ti, h
1
i ). Since ti believes in sequential rationality, and since sj(ti, h
1
i ) is the
unique sequentially rational strategy for tj(ti, h
1
i ), it follows that sj(ti, h
2
i ) = sj(ti, h
1
i ), which
implies that ti satisfies Bayesian updating. This completes the proof. ¥
By combining Lemma 4.2 and Lemma 4.4, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 4.5. Let ti be a type that believes in sequential rationality and satisfies minimal
belief revision. Then, ti has a sequentially rational strategy.
4.2. Relation with Proper Belief Revision
We next prove that minimal belief revision and belief in Bayesian updating leads to proper belief
revision: a concept that has been put forward in Perea (2003a, 2003b and 2004). This result
will prove to be crucial for establishing the announced relationship with backward induction.
Informally, proper belief revision states that a player who wishes to revise his beliefs at decision
node h about opponent j’s preference relation, should not change his belief about the opponent’s
relative ranking of two strategies sj and s
0
j if both sj and s
0
j could have led to h. The intuition
is that the player, upon arriving at h, cannot exclude any of the opponent’s strategies sj and
s0j , and therefore there is no reason for him to change his belief about the opponent’s relative
ranking of sj and s
0
j . In order to introduce proper belief revision formally, we need some more
notation and definitions. Let ti be a type for player i, and hi ∈ H∗i some decision node. For
a given strategy si ∈ Si(hi), recall that z(si, ti, hi) denotes the terminal node that would be
reached if the game would start at hi, player i would choose according to si, and player i’s
opponents would choose according to s−i(ti, hi). For two strategies si, s0i ∈ Si(hi),we say that ti
strictly prefers strategy si over strategy s
0
i at decision node hi if ti strictly prefers the terminal
node z(si, ti, hi) over the terminal node z(s
0
i, ti, hi). Now, let ti be a type for player i, let j 6= i
be an opponent, let hi and hj be decision nodes for players i and j, respectively, and let sj , s
0
j
be two player j strategies in Sj(hj).
Definition 4.6. We say that ti believes at hi that player j at hj strictly prefers strategy sj
over strategy s0j if type tj(ti, hi) strictly prefers sj over s
0
j at hj .
Now, let ti be a type for player i, and let h
1
i , h
2
i be two decision nodes in H
∗
i such that h
2
i
follows h1i and no other player i decision node is between h
1
i and h
2
i .
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Definition 4.7. We say that ti satisfies proper belief revision at h
2
i if for every opponent j,
every decision node hj ∈ Hj and every two strategies sj , s0j that belong to both Sj(hj) and
Sj(h
2
i ) the following holds: ti believes at h
2
i that player j at hj strictly prefers sj over s
0
j if and
only if ti believes so at h
1
i .
Note that sj , s
0
j ∈ Sj(h2i ) implies that both sj and s0j could have led to h2i .We say that type
ti satisfies proper belief revision if ti does so at each of his decision nodes.
Before showing that minimal belief revision and belief in Bayesian updating imply proper
belief revision, we prove the following lemma. It states that the distance between two preference
relations P 1 and P 2 can be reduced strictly by applying the following procedure: First, take an
unordered pair {a, b} of terminal nodes on which P 1 and P 2 disagree, and then interchange the
roles of a and b in P 2 without changing the roles of the other nodes.
Lemma 4.8. Let P 1 and P 2 be two preference relations on the set Z of terminal nodes, and
let {a, b} be an unordered pair of terminal nodes on which P 1 and P 2 disagree. Let u2 be an
arbitrary utility representation of P 2, and let the utility function u˜2 be given by
u˜2(z) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
u2(b), if z = a,
u2(a), if z = b,
u2(z), otherwise.
Let P˜ 2 be the preference relation induced by u˜2. Then, d(P
1, P˜ 2) < d(P 1, P 2).
The proof can be found in the appendix. We are now able to prove the following result.
Theorem 4.9. Let ti be a type that satisfies minimal belief revision and believes that every
opponent satisfies Bayesian updating. Then, ti satisfies proper belief revision.
Proof. For a given type ti ∈ Ti, decision node hi ∈ H∗i , and strategy si ∈ Si(hi), recall that
z(si, ti, hi) is the terminal node that is reached if the game would start at hi, player i chooses
si and i’s opponents would act according to s−i(ti, hi). Let
Z(ti, hi) = {z(si, ti, hi) | si ∈ Si(hi)}
be the set of terminal nodes that can be reached if the game would start at hi and player i’s
opponents would act according to s−i(ti, hi).
Let ti be a type for player i that satisfies minimal belief revision and believes that every
opponent satisfies Bayesian updating. We prove that ti satisfies proper belief revision. Suppose,
contrary to what we want to prove, that ti does not satisfy proper belief revision. Then, there
must be two decision nodes h1i , h
2
i ∈ H∗i such that h2i follows h1i and no other player i decision
node is between h1i and h
2
i , an opponent j, a decision node h
∗
j ∈ Hj and two strategies sj , s0j ∈
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Sj(h
∗
j ) ∩ Sj(h2i ) such that: ti believes at h1i that player j strictly prefers sj over s0j at h∗j , but
does not believe so at h2i .
2 Let t1j = tj(ti, h
1
i ) and t
2
j = tj(ti, h
2
i ), and let P
1
j and P
2
j denote the
preference relations of t1j and t
2
j , respectively. Since ti satisfies minimal belief revision, it must
be the case that t2j = (t
1
j , P
2
j ). In particular, t
1
j and t
2
j hold the same conditional belief at h
∗
j
about the opponents’ strategy choices, that is, s−j(t1j , h
∗
j ) = s−j(t
2
j , h
∗
j ).
Since ti believes at h
1
i that player j strictly prefers sj over s
0
j at h
∗
j , but does not believe
so at h2i , we may conclude that P
1
j strictly prefers z(sj , t
1
j , h
∗
j ) over z(s
0
j , t
1
j , h
∗
j ), but P
2
j strictly
prefers z(s0j , t
1
j , h
∗
j) over z(sj , t
1
j , h
∗
j ). Let u
2
j be some arbitrary utility representation of P
2
j , and
let the utility function u˜2j be given by
u˜2j(z) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
u2j(z(s
0
j , t
1
j , h
∗
j)), if z = z(sj , t
1
j , h
∗
j ),
u2j(z(sj , t
1
j , h
∗
j)), if z = z(s
0
j , t
1
j , h
∗
j ),
u2j(z), otherwise.
(4.1)
Let P˜ 2j be the preference relation induced by u˜
2
j . Since P
1
j and P
2
j disagree on {z(sj , t1j , h∗j ),
z(s0j , t
1
j , h
∗
j )}, we know by Lemma 4.8 that d(P 1j , P˜ 2j ) < d(P 1j , P 2j ).
We now prove that the type t˜2j = (t
1
j , P˜
2
j ) rationalizes the event of reaching h
2
i , which would
contradict our assumption that ti satisfies minimal belief revision. Since t
1
j = tj(ti, h
1
i ), and ti
believes that player j satisfies Bayesian updating, it follows that t1j satisfies Bayesian updating.
Since t2j = (t
1
j , P
2
j ) and t˜
2
j = (t
1
j , P˜
2
j ), we have that also t
2
j and t˜
2
j satisfy Bayesian updating.
By Lemma 4.2 we know that t2j and t˜
2
j have a sequentially rational strategy, which must then
be unique. Let s2j and s˜
2
j be the unique sequentially rational strategies for types t
2
j and t˜
2
j ,
respectively. Recall that, by definition, t2j = tj(ti, h
2
i ). As ti satisfies minimal belief revision,
t2j must rationalize the event of reaching h
2
i and hence s
2
j ∈ Sj(h2i ). In order to prove that t˜2j
rationalizes the event of reaching h2i , we must show that s˜
2
j ∈ Sj(h2i ).
For every hj ∈ Hj preceding h2i , let a(hj , h2i ) be the unique action at hj leading to h2i . In
order to show that s˜2j ∈ Sj(h2i ), we prove that s˜2j(hj) = a(hj , h2i ) for all hj ∈ Hj(s˜2j ) preceding
h2i . Choose some hj ∈ Hj(s˜2j ) preceding h2i . As s2j ∈ Sj(h2i ), we have that hj ∈ Hj(s2j ) and
s2j (hj) = a(hj , h
2
i ). By assumption, s
2
j is sequentially rational for t
2
j = (t
1
j , P
2
j ), which means in
particular that s2j is optimal for t
2
j at hj . Hence, P
2
j strictly prefers z(s
2
j , t
1
j , hj) over all other
nodes in Z(t1j , hj). We distinguish two cases.
Case 1. Suppose that z(s2j , t
1
j , hj) 6= z(s0j , t1j , h∗j ), where s0j is the strategy as discussed above.
Since P 2j strictly prefers z(s
2
j , t
1
j , hj) over all other nodes in Z(t
1
j , hj), we have by (4.1) that P˜
2
j
also strictly prefers z(s2j , t
1
j , hj) over all other nodes in Z(t
1
j , hj). This implies that s
2
j is optimal for
2Note that if ti believes at h
1
i that player j is indiﬀerent at h
∗
j between sj and s
0
j , then necessarily
z(sj , tj(ti, h
1
i ), h
∗
j ) = z(s
0
j , tj(ti, h
1
i ), h
∗
j ). By minimal belief revision of ti, we have that tj(ti, h
1
i ) and tj(ti, h
2
i )
hold the same conditional beliefs, and hence z(sj , tj(ti, h
2
i ), h
∗
j ) = z(s
0
j , tj(ti, h
2
i ), h
∗
j ), which implies that ti be-
lieves at h2i that player j is indiﬀerent between sj and s
0
j .
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t˜2j at hj . Since we know that s˜
2
j is optimal for t˜
2
j at hj , it follows that s˜
2
j(hj) = s
2
j (hj) = a(hj , h
2
i ),
which was to show.
Case 2. Suppose that z(s2j , t
1
j , hj) = z(s
0
j , t
1
j , h
∗
j ). In this case, the terminal node z(s
2
j , t
1
j , hj)
follows both hj and h
∗
j . Hence, it must be the case that hj precedes or follows h
∗
j .We distinguish
two subcases.
Case 2.1. Suppose that hj precedes h
∗
j . Since z(s
2
j , t
1
j , hj) follows h
∗
j , it must be the case
that s−j(t1j , hj) ∈ S−j(h∗j ). We have seen above that t1j satisfies Bayesian updating, which then
implies that s−j(t1j , h
∗
j ) = s−j(t
1
j , hj). As sj ∈ Sj(h∗j ), it follows that sj ∈ Sj(hj) and that
z(sj , t
1
j , hj) = z(sj , t
1
j , h
∗
j ). Since P
2
j strictly prefers z(s
2
j , t
1
j , hj) = z(s
0
j , t
1
j , h
∗
j ) over all other
nodes in Z(t1j , hj), it follows by (4.1) that P˜
2
j strictly prefers z(sj , t
1
j , hj) = z(sj , t
1
j , h
∗
j ) over all
other nodes in Z(t1j , hj). Hence, sj is optimal for t˜
2
j at hj . Since, by assumption, s˜
2
j is optimal
for t˜2j at hj , it follows that s˜
2
j (hj) = sj(hj). Since sj ∈ Sj(h2i ), we have that sj(hj) = a(hj , h2i ).
Hence, s˜2j (hj) = a(hj , h
2
i ), which was to show.
Case 2.2. Suppose that h∗j precedes hj . As z(s
0
j , t
1
j , h
∗
j ) = z(s
2
j , t
1
j , hj) follows hj , we must have
that s−j(t1j , h
∗
j ) ∈ S−j(hj). By Bayesian updating of t1j , we may then conclude that s−j(t1j , hj) =
s−j(t1j , h
∗
j ). Since sj ∈ Sj(h2i ) and hj precedes h2i , we have that sj ∈ Sj(hj) as well. Combined
with the fact that s−j(t1j , hj) = s−j(t
1
j , h
∗
j ), this implies that z(sj , t
1
j , hj) = z(sj , t
1
j , h
∗
j ). Since
P 2j strictly prefers z(s
2
j , t
1
j , hj) = z(s
0
j , t
1
j , h
∗
j ) over all other nodes in Z(t
1
j , hj), it follows by (4.1)
that P˜ 2j strictly prefers z(sj , t
1
j , hj) = z(sj , t
1
j , h
∗
j ) over all other nodes in Z(t
1
j , hj).We may thus
conclude that sj is optimal for t˜
2
j at hj . As s˜
2
j is optimal for t˜
2
j at hj as well, it follows that
s˜2j (hj) = sj(hj). By assumption, sj ∈ Sj(h2i ), implying that sj(hj) = a(hj , h2i ). Hence, we may
conclude that s˜2j (hj) = a(hj , h
2
i ), which was to show.
From Case 1 and 2 we may therefore conclude that s˜2j (hj) = a(hj , h
2
i ) for all decision nodes
hj ∈ Hj(s˜2j ) preceding h2i . This, in turn, implies that s˜2j ∈ Sj(h2i ). As s˜2j is the unique sequentially
rational strategy for t˜2j , this leads to the conclusion that t˜
2
j = (t
1
j , P˜
2
j ) rationalizes the event of
reaching h2i . Since we have seen that d(P
1
j , P˜
2
j ) < d(P
1
j , P
2
j ), we have thus found a preference
relation P˜ 2j with the properties that (t
1
j , P˜
2
j ) rationalizes the event of reaching h
2
i , but d(P
1
j , P˜
2
j ) <
d(P 1j , P
2
j ). This, however, contradicts our assumption that ti satisfies minimal belief revision.
Therefore, the assumption that ti does not satisfy proper belief revision cannot be true. Hence,
ti must satisfy proper belief revision. This completes the proof of our theorem. ¥
5. Relation with Backward Induction
In this section we show that common belief in the events that types (1) believe in sequential
rationality, (2) satisfy minimal belief revision and (3) initially believe in some profile P = (Pi)i∈I
of preference relations, leads to backward induction in the game induced by P. We divide this
result into two parts. In the first part, Theorem 5.1, it is shown that for every player there is at
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least one type that respects common belief in the three events listed above. As such, common
belief in these three events is always possible. The second part, Theorem 5.2, shows that every
type ti that has preference relation Pi and satisfies common belief in the events that types believe
in sequential rationality, satisfy minimal belief revision and initially believe in P, must choose
his backward induction strategy in the game induced by P.
For the proof of Theorem 5.1 and the statement of Theorem 5.2, we need the following
definitions. Let S be an extensive form structure with perfect information, and P = (Pi)i∈I
a profile of preference relations on the set of terminal nodes. Then, the pair (S, P ) may be
interpreted as a game, and the backward induction procedure in the game (S, P ) leads to a
unique backward induction action a∗(hi) at every decision node hi. For every player i, let s∗i be
the unique strategy that chooses the backward induction action a∗(hi) at every hi ∈ Hi(s∗i ).We
refer to s∗i as the backward induction strategy for player i in (S, P ).
Theorem 5.1. Let S be an extensive form structure with perfect information, and P = (Pi)i∈I
a profile of preference relations on the set of terminal nodes. Then, for every player i there is
a type ti that respects common belief in the events that types believe in sequential rationality,
satisfy minimal belief revision, and initially believe in P.
Proof. For every player i, decision node hi ∈ H∗i and opponent j 6= i, let s∗j(hi) be the unique
strategy for player j with the following properties: (1) at every decision node hj ∈ Hj(s∗j (hi))
preceding hi, the strategy s
∗
j (hi) prescribes the unique action that leads to hi, and (2) at every
decision node hj ∈ Hj(s∗j (hi)) not preceding hi, it prescribes the backward induction action
a∗(hj) in the game (S, P ). Then, by construction, s∗j(hi) is a strategy in Sj(hi). Moreover,
s∗j (h0) coincides with the backward induction strategy s
∗
j in (S, P ).
For every player i, denote by βi the conditional belief vector about the opponents’ strategy
choices in which player i, at every decision node hi ∈ H∗i , believes that each opponent j chooses
the strategy s∗j (hi) ∈ Sj(hi). By construction, the unique strategy that is sequentially rational
for player i with respect to the conditional belief vector βi and the preference relation Pi is his
backward induction strategy s∗i in (S, P ).
Fix a player i and an opponent j 6= i. For every decision node hi ∈ H∗i we shall define a
conditional belief Pj(hi) for player i about player j’s preference relation. We proceed recursively,
starting from h0. At h0, let Pj(h0) = Pj . Now, take a decision node h
2
i ∈ H∗i and suppose that
Pj(h
1
i ) has already been defined for all h
1
i ∈ H∗i that precede h2i . Let h1i be the unique decision
node in H∗i preceding h
2
i with the property that no other player i decision node lies between
h1i and h
2
i . By assumption, Pj(h
1
i ) has already been defined. We can now choose a preference
relation Pj(h
2
i ) with the following properties: (1) the conditional belief vector βj for player j
and the preference relation Pj(h
2
i ) together rationalize the event of reaching h
2
i , and (2) there is
no preference relation P˜j(h
2
i ) that together with βj rationalizes the event of reaching h
2
i , and for
which d(Pj(h
1
i ), P˜j(h
2
i )) < d(Pj(h
1
i ), Pj(h
2
i )). In this way, a conditional belief Pj(hi) about player
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j’s preference relation can be defined for every player i, every opponent j, and every decision
node hi ∈ H∗i .
We may now construct a set of types
T ∗ = {tj(hi) | i, j ∈ I, i 6= j and hi ∈ H∗i }
with the following properties:
(1) the preference relation for tj(hi) is equal to Pj(hi);
(2) the conditional belief vector of tj(hi) about the opponents’ strategy choices is given by βj ,
that is, sk(tj(hi), hj) = s
∗
k(hj) for all hj ∈ H∗j and all opponents k 6= j;
(3) the conditional belief of tj(hi) at decision node hj ∈ H∗j about opponent k’s type is equal to
tk(hj).
We now prove that every type tj(hi) ∈ T ∗ respects common belief in the event that types
believe in sequential rationality, satisfy minimal belief revision and initially believe in P. By
construction, every type t ∈ T ∗ believes, at each of his decision nodes, that each of his opponents’
types belongs to T ∗. It is therefore suﬃcient to show that every type tj(hi) ∈ T ∗ believes in
sequential rationality, satisfies minimal belief revision, and initially believes in P.
Initial belief in P. Choose an arbitrary type tj(hi) ∈ T ∗. By definition, tj(hi) believes at h0
that every opponent k is of type tk(h0). Since tk(h0) has preference relation Pk(h0) and since,
by construction, Pk(h0) = Pk, we have that tj(hi) believes at h0 that every opponent k has
preference relation Pk. Hence, tj(hi) initially believes in P.
Minimal belief revision. Choose an arbitrary type tj(hi) ∈ T ∗ and some opponent k 6= j.
Take some decision nodes h1j and h
2
j such that h
2
j follows h
1
j and no other player j decision node
is between h1j and h
2
j . By definition, tj(hi) believes at h
1
j that player k has type tk(h
1
j ), and
believes at h2j that player k has type tk(h
2
j ). By construction of tk(h
1
j ) and tk(h
2
j ) we know that
tk(h
1
j ) has preference relation Pk(h
1
j ), that tk(h
2
j ) has preference relation Pk(h
2
j), and that tk(h
1
j )
and tk(h
2
j) have identical conditional beliefs about the opponents’ strategies and types. As such,
tk(h
2
j ) = (tk(h
1
j ), Pk(h
2
j )).
Moreover, by construction of the preference relation Pk(h
2
j ), we know that (1) the conditional
belief vector βk for player k and the preference relation Pk(h
2
j) together rationalize the event
of reaching h2j , and (2) there is no preference relation P˜k(h
2
j ) that together with βk rationalizes
the event of reaching h2j , and for which d(Pk(h
1
j ), P˜k(h
2
j )) < d(Pk(h
1
j ), Pk(h
2
j )). As βk is the
conditional belief vector for types tk(h
1
j ) and tk(h
2
j ) about the opponents’ strategies, it follows
from (1) and (2) above that tj(hi) satisfies minimal belief revision.
Belief in sequential rationality. Take some arbitrary tj(hi) ∈ T ∗, a decision node hj ∈ H∗j
and some opponent k. By definition, tj(hi) believes at hj that opponent k has type tk(hj) and
chooses strategy s∗k(hj). We prove that s
∗
k(hj) is sequentially rational for tk(hj). We do so by
induction on the number of decision nodes in H∗j that precede hj .
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Assume first that hj is not preceded by any decision node in H
∗
j , that is, hj = h0. In this
case, tk(h0) has preference relation Pk(h0) which, by construction, is equal to Pk. Since tk(h0)’s
conditional belief vector about the opponents’ strategy choices is given by βk, it follows that
tk(h0) has a unique sequentially rational strategy, namely his backward induction strategy in
(S, P ), which is s∗k = s∗k(h0). We thus have that s∗k(h0) is sequentially rational for tk(h0), which
was to show.
Now, take some decision node h2j ∈ H∗j \{h0} and assume that for every h1j ∈ H∗j preceding
h2j it holds that s
∗
k(h
1
j ) is sequentially rational for tk(h
1
j ). We prove that s
∗
k(h
2
j) is sequentially
rational for tk(h
2
j ). Hence, we must prove for every hk ∈ Hk(s∗k(h2j )) that s∗k(h2j) is optimal for
tk(h
2
j ) at hk. We distinguish two cases.
Case 1. Assume that hk ∈ Hk(s∗k(h2j )) and that hk does not precede h2j . Then, by definition
of s∗k(h
2
j ), we have that s
∗
k(h
2
j ) prescribes the backward induction action a
∗(h0k) at every player k
decision node h0k weakly following hk. Suppose, contrary to what we want to prove, that s
∗
k(h
2
j )
is not optimal for tk(h
2
j ) at hk. Hence, there is some sk(h
2
j ) ∈ Sk(hk) such that tk(h2j ) strictly
prefers sk(h
2
j ) over s
∗
k(h
2
j ) at hk. Now, let the strategy s˜k(h
2
j ) be such that (1) s˜k(h
2
j ) coincides
with sk(h
2
j ) at all decision nodes inHk(s˜k(h
2
j )) weakly following hk, and (2) s˜k(h
2
j ) coincides with
s∗k(h
2
j ) at all other decision nodes in Hk(s˜k(h
2
j )). Since s
∗
k(h
2
j ) ∈ Sk(hk) ∩ Sk(h2j ), and hk does
not precede h2j , it follows that s˜k(h
2
j ) ∈ Sk(hk) ∩ Sk(h2j ) as well. Moreover, as s˜k(h2j) coincides
with sk(h
2
j ) in the subgame starting at hk, we may conclude that tk(h
2
j ) strictly prefers s˜k(h
2
j )
over s∗k(h
2
j ) at hk. Since tj(hi) believes at h
2
j that player k is of type tk(h
2
j ), the following holds:
tj(hi) believes at h
2
j that player k, at hk, strictly prefers s˜k(h
2
j ) over s
∗
k(h
2
j ), (5.1)
where both s˜k(h
2
j ) and s
∗
k(h
2
j ) are in Sk(hk) ∩ Sk(h2j ).
We have seen above that tj(hi) satisfies minimal belief revision. Moreover, since every t ∈ T ∗
satisfies Bayesian updating, we may conclude that tj(hi) believes that every opponent satisfies
Bayesian updating. By Theorem 4.9 we may thus conclude that tj(hi) satisfies proper belief
revision. Now, let h1j be the unique decision node in H
∗
j that precedes h
2
j and for which no other
player j decision node is between h1j and h
2
j . Since both s˜k(h
2
j ) and s
∗
k(h
2
j ) are in Sk(hk)∩Sk(h2j ),
proper belief revision of tj(hi) together with (5.1) implies the following:
tj(hi) believes at h
1
j that player k, at hk, strictly prefers s˜k(h
2
j ) over s
∗
k(h
2
j ). (5.2)
As h1j precedes h
2
j , and hk does not precede h
2
j , we must have that hk does not precede h
1
j .
Hence, s∗k(h
1
j ) prescribes at every player k decision node h
0
k weakly following hk the backward
induction a∗(h0k), just as s
∗
k(h
2
j) does. Together with (5.2), this yields:
tj(hi) believes at h
1
j that player k, at hk, strictly prefers s˜k(h
2
j ) over s
∗
k(h
1
j).
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Since tj(hi) believes at h
1
j that player k has type tk(h
1
j ), it follows that s
∗
k(h
1
j ) is not sequentially
rational for tk(h
1
j ), which contradicts our induction assumption that s
∗
k(h
1
j ) is sequentially ratio-
nal for tk(h
1
j ). Hence, we may conclude that s
∗
k(h
2
j) is optimal for tk(h
2
j) at every hk ∈ Hk(s∗k(h2j ))
not preceding h2j . This completes Case 1.
Case 2. Assume that hk ∈ Hk(s∗k(h2j )) precedes h2j . Since tj(hi) satisfies minimal belief revi-
sion, as we have seen above, it must be the case that the type tk(h
2
j ) = tk(tj(hi), h
2
j ) rationalizes
the event of reaching h2j . Hence, tk(h
2
j ) has a sequentially rational strategy sk(h
2
j ) in Sk(h
2
j ).
Suppose, contrary to what we want to prove, that s∗k(h
2
j ) is not optimal for tk(h
2
j ) at hk. Then,
necessarily,
tk(h
2
j ) strictly prefers z(sk(h
2
j ), tk(h
2
j ), hk) over z(s
∗
k(h
2
j ), tk(h
2
j), hk). (5.3)
Since sk(h
2
j ) and s
∗
k(h
2
j ) are both in Sk(h
2
j ), they coincide on all player k decision nodes preceding
h2j . Hence, by (5.3), there must be some player k decision node h
0
k not preceding h
2
j such that
(1) s−k(tk(h2j ), hk) ∈ S−k(h0k), and (2) (sk(h2j ), s−k(tk(h2j ), hk)) and (s∗k(h2j), s−k(tk(h2j ), hk)) both
reach h0k. By Bayesian updating of tk(h
2
j), we then have that s−k(tk(h
2
j ), h
0
k) = s−k(tk(h
2
j ), hk).
This implies that
z(sk(h
2
j ), tk(h
2
j ), hk) = z(sk(h
2
j ), tk(h
2
j ), h
0
k) and z(s
∗
k(h
2
j), tk(h
2
j ), hk) = z(s
∗
k(h
2
j ), tk(h
2
j ), h
0
k).
Together with (5.3), we may conclude that
tk(h
2
j ) strictly prefers z(sk(h
2
j ), tk(h
2
j ), h
0
k) over z(s
∗
k(h
2
j ), tk(h
2
j), h
0
k),
which means that s∗k(h
2
j ) is not optimal for tk(h
2
j ) at h
0
k. However, this contradicts our findings
in Case 1, as h0k does not precede h
2
j . Therefore, s
∗
k(h
2
j) must be optimal for tk(h
2
j ) at hk. This
completes Case 2.
By combining the cases 1 and 2, we have shown for every hk ∈ Hk(s∗k(h2j )) that s∗k(h2j) is
optimal for tk(h
2
j ) at hk. As such, s
∗
k(h
2
j ) is sequentially rational for tk(h
2
j ). Since tj(hi) believes
at h2j that player k is of type tk(h
2
j ) and chooses strategy s
∗
k(h
2
j ), and since this holds for every
h2j and every opponent k, it follows that tj(hi) believes in sequential rationality, which was to
show.
We may thus conclude that every type t ∈ T ∗ believes in sequential rationality, satisfies min-
imal belief revision and initially believes in P. As every type t ∈ T ∗ believes that all opponents’
types are in T ∗, it holds that every type t ∈ T ∗ respects common belief in the events that every
type believes in sequential rationality, satisfies minimal belief revision and initially believes in
P. This completes the proof of this theorem. ¥
We now prove that common belief in the events that types believe in sequential rationality,
satisfy minimal belief revision, and initially believe in a profile P of preference relations, leads
to backward induction in the game with preference relations P.
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Theorem 5.2. Let S be an extensive form structure with perfect information, and P = (Pi)i∈I
a profile of preference relations on the set of terminal nodes. Let ti be a type with preference
relation Pi, respecting common belief in the events that types believe in sequential rationality,
satisfy minimal belief revision, and initially believe in P. Then, there is a unique sequentially
rational strategy for ti, namely player i’s backward induction strategy in (S, P ).
Proof. For a given player i, decision node hi ∈ H∗i and opponent j, let S∗j (hi) be the set of
player j strategies sj such that (1) sj ∈ Sj(hi), and (2) at every hj ∈ Hj(sj) following hi, the
strategy sj prescribes the backward induction action a
∗(hj) in (S, P ). We prove the following
property.
Claim. Let ti be a player i type that respects common belief in the events that types believe
in sequential rationality, satisfy minimal belief revision, and initially believe in P. Then,
sj(ti, hi) ∈ S∗j (hi)
for all hi ∈ H∗i and all opponents j.
Proof of Claim. We prove the claim by induction on the number of decision nodes following
hi. If hi is not followed by any decision node, the statement is trivial since S
∗
j (hi) = Sj(hi).
Suppose now that the claim holds for all pairs (i0, j0) of players and every decision node hi0
followed by at most K − 1 decision nodes. Choose hi with the property that hi is followed
by exactly K decision nodes. We prove that sj(ti, hi) ∈ S∗j (hi) for all opponents j. Hence, we
must show that for every decision node hj ∈ Hj(sj(ti, hi)) following hi, the strategy sj(ti, hi)
prescribes the backward induction action a∗(hj).
Let t∗j = tj(ti, hi) and s
∗
j = sj(ti, hi). Choose a decision node hj ∈ Hj(s∗j ) following hi. We
shall prove that s∗j (hj) = a
∗(hj). As ti respects common belief in the events that types believe
in sequential rationality, satisfy minimal belief revision, and initially believe in P, and since ti
believes at hi that player j is of type t
∗
j , it follows that t
∗
j respects common belief in the events
that types believe in sequential rationality, satisfy minimal belief revision, and initially believe
in P. Since hj is followed by at most K − 1 decision nodes, we thus know by the induction
assumption that
sk(t
∗
j , hj) ∈ S∗k(hj)
for all opponents k 6= j. Consequently, t∗j believes at hj that all opponents choose their backward
induction actions in (S, P ) at the decision nodes following hj .
As ti initially believes in P, it follows that tj(ti, h0) has preference relation Pj .Moreover, since
ti satisfies minimal belief revision, it must be the case that tj(ti, h0) has the same conditional
belief vector as tj(ti, hi) = t
∗
j . We may thus conclude that tj(ti, h0) believes at hj that all
opponents choose their backward induction actions in (S, P ) at the decision nodes following
hj . Together with the fact that tj(ti, h0) has preference relation Pj , it follows that tj(ti, h0)’s
optimal strategies at hj all prescribe the backward induction action a
∗(hj) at hj .More precisely,
for every sj ∈ Sj(hj) not prescribing a∗(hj) at hj there is some s0j ∈ Sj(hj) prescribing a∗(hj)
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at hj such that tj(ti, h0) strictly prefers s
0
j over sj at hj . This, in turn, means that ti believes at
h0 that for every sj ∈ Sj(hj) not prescribing a∗(hj) at hj there is some s0j ∈ Sj(hj) prescribing
a∗(hj) at hj such that player j strictly prefers s0j over sj at hj .
Since ti believes that all opponents believe in sequential rationality and satisfy minimal belief
revision, we know by Lemma 4.4 that ti believes that all opponents satisfy Bayesian updating.
Together with the fact that ti satisfies minimal belief revision, we may conclude by Theorem
4.9 that ti satisfies proper belief revision. Therefore, ti’s belief at hi about player j’s preference
relation at hj over strategies in Sj(hj)∩Sj(hi) should coincide with ti’s belief at h0 about player
j’s preference relation at hj over strategies in Sj(hj) ∩ Sj(hi). Since, by assumption, hj follows
hi we have that Sj(hj) ⊆ Sj(hi). Hence, ti’s belief at hi about player j’s preference relation over
strategies in Sj(hj) should coincide with ti’s belief at the beginning about player j’s preference
relation at hj over strategies in Sj(hj). Since we have seen that ti believes at h0 that for every
sj ∈ Sj(hj) not prescribing a∗(hj) at hj there is some s0j ∈ Sj(hj) prescribing a∗(hj) at hj such
that player j strictly prefers s0j over sj at hj , it follows that ti believes so at hi. This implies,
however, that ti believes at hi that player j’s optimal strategies at hj all prescribe the backward
induction action a∗(hj) at hj .
Since ti believes in sequential rationality, and since s
∗
j = sj(ti, hi), we must have that s
∗
j
is optimal for tj(ti, hi) at hj . By the above, it follows that s
∗
j must prescribe the backward
induction a∗(hj) at hj , which was to show. This completes the proof of the claim.
Now, let ti be a type that has preference relation Pi, and that respects common belief in the
events that types believe in sequential rationality, satisfy minimal belief revision and initially
believe in P. By the claim, we know that ti believes at every decision node hi that his opponents
will choose the backward induction actions in (S, P ) at every decision node following hi. Since
ti has preference relation Pi, the unique sequentially rational strategy for ti is his backward
induction strategy in (S, P ). This completes the proof. ¥
6. Dropping Minimal Belief Revision
In the previous section we have seen that common belief in the events that types initially believe
in P, believe in sequential rationality and satisfy minimal belief revision, singles out the backward
induction strategy for player i in the game (S, P ). In this section we investigate how crucial
“minimal belief revision” is in establishing this relationship with backward induction. More
precisely, we study the consequences of replacing the minimal belief revision requirement by the
more basic condition of Bayesian updating. We shall prove that the resulting rationality concept
allows for any strategy that survives the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure (Dekel and Fudenberg
(1990)), that is, one round of elimination of weakly dominated strategies followed by iterative
elimination of strongly dominated strategies. As to formally state this result, we must first
define the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure in some more detail.
Let S be an extensive form structure with perfect information and P = (Pi)i∈I a profile
of preference relations on the terminal nodes. For every player i, let ui be an arbitrary utility
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function on the terminal nodes that represents Pi, and let u = (ui)i∈I . Let ∆(Si) be the set of
probability distributions on the set Si of player i strategies, and let S−i = ×j 6=iSj be the set of
opponents’ strategy profiles. For a pair (µi, s−i) ∈ ∆(Si)× S−i, we denote by
ui(µi, s−i) =
X
si∈Si
µi(si) ui(z(si, s−i))
the expected utility induced by (µi, s−i) and the utility function ui. Here, z(si, s−i) denotes
the terminal node reached by the strategy profile (si, s−i). We say that strategy si is weakly
dominated with respect to ui if there is some µi ∈ ∆(Si) such that (1) ui(µi, s−i) ≥ ui(si, s−i)
for all s−i ∈ S−i, and (2) ui(µi, s−i) > ui(si, s−i) for some s−i ∈ S−i. Now, fix some subset
S˜−i ⊆ S−i of opponents’ strategy profiles. We say that si is strongly dominated on S˜−i with
respect to ui if there is some µi ∈ ∆(Si) such that ui(µi, s−i) > ui(si, s−i) for all s−i ∈ S˜−i.
For every player i, let DF 1i (u) be the set of strategies in Si that are not weakly dominated
with respect to ui. For every player i and every k ≥ 2, recursively define DF ki (u) as the set of
strategies in DF k−1i (u) that are not strongly dominated on ×j 6=iDF k−1j (u) with respect to ui.
Finally, let DF∞i (u) = ∩k∈NDF ki (u) for every player i. We say that a strategy si ∈ Si survives
the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure with respect to u if and only if si ∈ DF∞i (u). The following
theorem states that replacing minimal belief revision by Bayesian updating in the model leads
to the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure.
Theorem 6.1. Let S be an extensive form structure with perfect information, P = (Pi)i∈I a
profile of preference relations on the terminal nodes, and si a strategy for player i. Then, the
following two statements are equivalent:
(1) si is sequentially rational for some type ti having preference relation Pi and respecting com-
mon belief in the events that types believe in sequential rationality, satisfy Bayesian updating,
and initially believe in P ;
(2) si survives the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure with respect to every u representing P.
Here, we say that u represents P if for every player i it holds that ui represents Pi. In
particular, the theorem implies that the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure for generic games with
perfect information does not depend upon the particular utility functions that are chosen to
represent the preference relations over terminal nodes. Since it is well-known that the Dekel-
Fudenberg procedure may select strategies, and even outcomes, that are not compatible with
backward induction, the minimal belief revision requirement may be seen as a property that
closes the gap between the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure and the backward induction procedure.
In Ben-Porath (1997) it has been shown that also the concept of “common certainty of
rationality at the beginning of the game” leads exactly to those strategies surviving the Dekel-
Fudenberg procedure. The latter concept is, however, built upon fundamentally diﬀerent princi-
ples than ours. Ben-Porath assumes, namely, that players believe throughout the game that the
opponents hold preference relations as given by P, while we only assume players to believe so
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at the beginning of the game. On the other hand, Ben-Porath only requires players to believe at
the beginning of the game that his opponents choose sequentially rational strategies, while our
“belief in sequential rationality” condition requires players to believe so at each instance of the
game. One could therefore argue that the concept of “common certainty of rationality at the
beginning of the game” is in some sense dual to the concept studied in this section. Nevertheless,
both concepts eventually make the same selection of strategies for each player.
As a preparatory step towards proving Theorem 6.1, we first characterize weakly dominated
and strongly dominated strategies in games with perfect information. These characterizations
are based upon results in Ben-Porath (1997) and Pearce (1984), and are stated in the following
lemma.3 In this lemma, we say that a strategy si is initially rational for type ti if si is optimal
for ti against the initial belief s−i(ti, h0).
Lemma 6.2. Let S be an extensive form structure with perfect information, Pi a preference
relation on the terminal nodes, ui a utility function representing Pi, and si a strategy for player
i. Then the following is true:
(1) si is not weakly dominated with respect to ui if and only if si is sequentially rational for
some type ti that has preference relation Pi and satisfies Bayesian updating;
(2) si is not strongly dominated on some S˜−i ⊆ S−i with respect to ui if and only if si is initially
rational for some type ti with preference relation Pi and initial belief s−i(ti, h0) ∈ S˜−i.
Proof. (1) Suppose that si is not weakly dominated with respect to ui. By Lemma 4 in
Pearce (1984), there is some µ−i ∈ ∆(S−i) with full support such that si is optimal against
µ−i with respect to ui. Then, by Lemma 1.1 in Ben-Porath (1997), there exists a probabilistic
updating system (µ−i(hi))hi∈Hi with µ−i(hi) ∈ ∆(S−i(hi)) for every hi ∈ Hi such that (a) this
updating system satisfies Bayesian updating, and (b) for every hi ∈ Hi(si), strategy si is optimal
against µ−i(hi) with respect to ui. By Lemma 1.2.1 in Ben-Porath (1997), there then exists a
deterministic updating system (s−i(hi))hi∈Hi with s−i(hi) ∈ S−i(hi) for every hi ∈ Hi such that
(a) this updating system satisfies Bayesian updating, and (b) for every hi ∈ Hi(si), strategy si
is optimal against s−i(hi) with respect to ui. One can then choose a type ti satisfying Bayesian
updating, with preference relation Pi, and with s−i(ti, hi) = s−i(hi) for all hi ∈ Hi. Hence, by
construction, si is sequentially rational for ti.
Now, suppose that si is sequentially rational for some type ti that has preference relation Pi
and satisfies Bayesian updating. Hence, for every hi ∈ Hi(si), the strategy si is optimal against
s−i(ti, hi) ∈ S−i(hi) with respect to ui. By Lemma 1.2 in Ben-Porath (1997), it then follows
that si is optimal with respect to ui against some µ−i ∈ ∆(S−i) with full support. Lemma 4 in
Pearce (1984) implies that si is not weakly dominated with respect to ui.
(2) Suppose that si is not strongly dominated on some S˜−i ⊆ S−i with respect to ui. By
Lemma 3 in Pearce (1984), we then know that there is some µ−i ∈ ∆(S˜−i) such that si is
3Formally, Lemmas 3 and 4 in Pearce (1984), which are the results we use here, are stated for two-player games
only. However, if one allows for correlated probability distributions on the opponents’ strategy spaces, as we do,
then Pearce’s results also apply to more than two players.
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optimal against µ−i with respect to ui. By the proof of Lemma 1.2.1 in Ben-Porath (1997), we
may conclude that there is some s−i in the support of µ−i such that si is optimal against s−i
with respect to ui (and hence with respect to Pi). Let ti be a type with preference relation Pi
and s−i(ti, h0) = s−i. Then, s−i(ti, h0) ∈ S˜−i and si is initially rational for ti.
Assume finally that si is initially rational for some type ti with preference relation Pi and
s−i(ti, h0) ∈ S˜−i. Then, si is optimal against s−i(ti, h0) ∈ S˜−i with respect to ui. But then, si
is obviously not strongly dominated on S˜−i with respect to ui. This completes the proof of this
lemma. ¥
By means of this lemma, we are now able to provide an alternative characterization of
strategies that survive the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure. Let P = (Pi)i∈I be a profile of prefer-
ence relations. For every player i, let S1i (P ) be the set of strategies that are sequentially rational
for some type ti with preference relation Pi that satisfies Bayesian updating. For k ≥ 2, recur-
sively define Ski (P ) as the set of strategies in S
k−1
i (P ) that are sequentially rational for some
ti with preference relation Pi, satisfying Bayesian updating, and with initial belief s−i(ti, h0) in
×j 6=iSk−1j (P ). Finally, let S∞i (P ) = ∩k∈NSki (P ). We obtain the following characterization.
Lemma 6.3. Let S be an extensive form structure with perfect information and P = (Pi)i∈I a
profile of preference relations. Then, S∞i (P ) = DF
∞
i (u) for every profile u of utility functions
representing P.
Proof. Choose a profile u of utility functions representing P.We show, by induction on k, that
Ski (P ) = DF
k
i (u) for all players i. By Lemma 6.2, part (1), we know that S
1
i (P ) = DF
1
i (u). Now,
let k ≥ 2 and assume that Sk−1j (P ) = DF k−1j (u) for all players j. We first show that Ski (P ) ⊆
DF ki (u). Take some arbitrary si ∈ Ski (P ). Hence, si is sequentially rational for some type ti
with preference relation Pi, satisfying Bayesian updating, and with s−i(ti, h0) ∈ ×j 6=iSk−1j (P ).
Since ti satisfies Bayesian updating, the fact that si is sequentially rational for ti implies that si
is initially rational for ti. By Lemma 6.2, part (2), it follows that si is not strongly dominated
on ×j 6=iSk−1j (P ) with respect to ui. Since, by induction assumption, Sk−1j (P ) = DF k−1j (u) for
all j 6= i, it follows that si is not strongly dominated on ×j 6=iDF k−1j (u) with respect to ui. On
the other hand, we know that si ∈ Ski (P ) ⊆ Sk−1i (P ) which, by induction assumption, is equal
to DF k−1i (u). Hence, si ∈ DF k−1i (u) and si is not strongly dominated on ×j 6=iDF k−1j (u) with
respect to ui, which implies that si ∈ DF ki (u).
We finally show that DF ki (u) ⊆ Ski (P ). Take some arbitrary si ∈ DF ki (u). Hence, si is not
strongly dominated on ×j 6=iDF k−1j (u) with respect to ui. By Lemma 6.2, part (2), we then
have that si is initially rational for some type ti with preference relation Pi and s−i(ti, h0) ∈
×j 6=iDF k−1j (u). Since, by induction assumption, DF k−1j (u) = Sk−1j (P ) for all j 6= i, we thus
have that si is initially rational for some type ti with preference relation Pi and s−i(ti, h0) ∈
×j 6=iSk−1j (P ). As si ∈ DF ki (u) ⊆ DF 1i (u) and, by induction assumption, DF 1i (u) = S1i (P ), it
follows that si ∈ S1i (P ). Hence, there is some type t0i with preference relation Pi and satisfying
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Bayesian updating, such that si is sequentially rational for t
0
i. Now, construct a type t
00
i with the
following properties: (1) t00i has preference relation Pi, (2) s−i(t
00
i , hi) = s−i(ti, h0) at all hi ∈ H∗i
for which s−i(ti, h0) ∈ S−i(hi), and (3) s−i(t00i , hi) = s−i(t0i, hi) at all other hi ∈ H∗i . Then,
by construction, si is sequentially rational for t
00
i . Since, moreover, t
00
i has preference relation Pi,
satisfies Bayesian updating and has initial belief s−i(t00i , h0) = s−i(ti, h0) ∈ ×j 6=iSk−1j (P ), we thus
have that si is sequentially rational for a type with preference relation Pi, satisfying Bayesian
updating, and with initial belief in ×j 6=iSk−1j (P ). On the other hand, si ∈ DF ki (u) ⊆ DF k−1i (u)
which, by induction assumption, is equal to Sk−1i (P ). Hence, si ∈ Sk−1i (P ). Together with the
previous insight, we may thus conclude that si ∈ Ski (P ). It thus follows that Ski (P ) = DF ki (u)
for all players i and all k, which implies that S∞i (P ) = DF
∞
i (u) for all players i. This completes
the proof. ¥
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 6.1.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. For every player i, let T ∗i (P ) be the set of player i types that have
preference relation Pi and respect common belief in the events that types believe in sequential
rationality, satisfy Bayesian updating and initially believe in P. Let S∗i (P ) be the set of player
i strategies that are sequentially rational for some type in T ∗i (P ).
We first show the implication from (1) to (2). Let u be an arbitrary profile of utility functions
that represents P. We show that S∗i (P ) ⊆ DF∞i (u). By Lemma 6.3 we know that DF∞i (u) =
S∞i (P ), and hence it is suﬃcient to show that S
∗
i (P ) ⊆ S∞i (P ), which in turn is equivalent to
showing that S∗i (P ) ⊆ Ski (P ) for every k. We prove the latter claim by induction on k.
For k = 1, we must show that S∗i (P ) ⊆ S1i (P ). Let si ∈ S∗i (P ). Then, by definition of S∗i (P ),
si is sequentially rational for some type ti satisfying Bayesian updating and having preference
relation Pi, and hence si ∈ S1i (P ). We may thus conclude that S∗i (P ) ⊆ S1i (P ) for all players i.
Now, let k ≥ 2, and assume that S∗j (P ) ⊆ Sk−1j (P ) for every player j. Choose an arbi-
trary player i. We prove that S∗i (P ) ⊆ Ski (P ). Choose some si ∈ S∗i (P ). Then, there is some
type ti with preference relation Pi and respecting common belief in the events that types be-
lieve in sequential rationality, satisfy Bayesian updating and initially believe in P, such that
si is sequentially rational for ti. Fix an opponent j. Then, it follows that strategy sj(ti, h0) is
sequentially rational for type tj(ti, h0), and, moreover, type tj(ti, h0) has preference relation
Pj and respects common belief in the events that types believe in sequential rationality, sat-
isfy Bayesian updating and initially believe in P. Hence, tj(ti, h0) ∈ T ∗j (P ). Since sj(ti, h0) is
sequentially rational for tj(ti, h0) ∈ T ∗j (P ), it follows that sj(ti, h0) ∈ S∗j (P ). We may thus
conclude that sj(ti, h0) ∈ S∗j (P ) for every opponent j and hence, by the induction assump-
tion, sj(ti, h0) ∈ Sk−1j (P ) for all opponents j. Therefore, si is sequentially rational for a type ti
that has preference relation Pi, satisfies Bayesian updating, and has initial belief s−i(ti, h0) in
×j 6=iSk−1j (P ). On the other hand we know that si ∈ S∗i (P ) which, by induction assumption, is
a subset of Sk−1i (P ). It thus follows that si ∈ Ski (P ). By induction, we may thus conclude that
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S∗i (P ) ⊆ Ski (P ) for every k and every player i, and hence S∗i (P ) ⊆ S∞i (P ) for every player i.
Hence, S∗i (P ) ⊆ DF∞i (u) for every player i. The implication from (1) and (2) thus follows.
We now show the implication from (2) to (1). Let u be a profile of utility functions that
represents P. We must show that DF∞i (P ) ⊆ S∗i (P ) for all players i. By Lemma 6.3 we know
that DF∞i (P ) = S
∞
i (P ), and hence it is suﬃcient to show that S
∞
i (P ) ⊆ S∗i (P ) for every player
i.
By construction of S∞i (P ), we may find for every si ∈ S∞i (P ) some type ti with preference
relation Pi, satisfying Bayesian updating and having initial belief s−i(ti, h0) in ×j 6=iS∞j (P ) such
that si is sequentially rational for ti. Hence, for every si ∈ S∞i (P ) there is an updating system
ci(si) = (ci(si)(hi))hi∈H∗i with ci(si)(hi) ∈ S−i(hi) for every hi ∈ H
∗
i (see Section 4.1) and
ci(si)(h0) ∈ ×j 6=iS∞j (P ), such that the updating system satisfies Bayesian updating, and si is
sequentially rational with respect to ci(si) and Pi.
For every si /∈ S∞i (P ) we may find some updating system ci(si) with ci(si)(h0) ∈ ×j 6=iS∞j (P ),
and preference relation Pi(si), not necessarily equal to Pi, such that ci(si) satisfies Bayesian
updating and si is sequentially rational with respect to ci(si) and Pi(si). For every si ∈ S∞i (P ),
simply set Pi(si) = Pi.
Now, suppose that these updating systems ci(si) and preference relations Pi(si) have been
defined for all players i and strategies si.We may construct for every player i and every strategy
si a type ti(si) with the following properties: (a) the preference relation of ti(si) is given by
Pi(si), (b) for every hi ∈ H∗i and opponent j, the conditional belief sj(ti(si), hi) about player
j’s strategy choice is given by cij(si)(hi), where cij(si)(hi) is the belief at hi about player j’s
strategy choice in the updating system ci(si), and (c) for every hi ∈ H∗i and opponent j, the
conditional belief tj(ti(si), hi) about player j’s type is given by tj(sj), where sj = cij(si)(hi).
Claim. Every type ti(si) respects common belief in the events that types believe in sequential
rationality, satisfy Bayesian updating and initially believe in P.
Proof of claim. Define T˜ = {ti(si) | i ∈ I and si ∈ Si}. By construction of the types ti(si),
we have that tj(ti(si), hi) ∈ T˜ for every player i, type ti(si) ∈ T˜ , decision node hi ∈ H∗i and
opponent j. Hence, in order to show the claim, it is suﬃcient to show that every type in T˜
believes in sequential rationality, satisfies Bayesian updating and initially believes in P.
Belief in sequential rationality. Let ti(si) be a type in T˜ . At every hi ∈ H∗i , the type ti(si)
believes that opponent j chooses strategy sj = cij(si)(hi) and believes that opponent j has type
tj(sj). By construction, type tj(sj)’s conditional belief about the opponents’ strategy choices
is given by cj(sj). Since sj is sequentially rational for cj(sj), it follows that sj is sequentially
rational for tj(sj). It therefore follows that the strategy sj(ti(si), hi) = sj is sequentially for
tj(ti(si), hi) = tj(sj) for every hi ∈ H∗i and every opponent j, which implies that ti(si) believes
in sequential rationality.
Bayesian updating. Bayesian updating of ti(si) ∈ T˜ follows immediately from the fact that
ti(si)’s conditional beliefs about the opponents’ strategy choices is given by ci(si), and the
assumption that ci(si) satisfies Bayesian updating.
Initial belief in P. Let ti(si) be a type in T˜ . Fix an opponent j. By definition, we have
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that sj(ti(si), h0) = cij(si)(h0). Since, by construction, ci(si)(h0) ∈ ×j 6=iS∞j (P ), we have that
cij(si)(h0) ∈ S∞j (P ). Hence, ti(si) initially believes that player j chooses some strategy sj ∈
S∞j (P ). As such, ti(si) initially believes that player j has type tj(sj), which has preference
relation Pj(sj) = Pj , since sj ∈ S∞j . We may thus conclude that ti(si) initially believes that
player j has preference relation Pj . Since this holds for all opponents j, it follows that ti(si)
initially believes in P.
We have thus shown that every type ti(si) in T˜ believes in sequential rationality, satisfies
Bayesian updating, and initially believes in P. This implies the statement in the claim.
Recall that it is our objective to show that S∞i (P ) ⊆ S∗i (P ). Take some arbitrary si ∈ S∞i (P ).
Then, si is sequentially rational for the type ti(si), and ti(si) has preference relation Pi(si) =
Pi. By the claim above, it follows that ti(si) has preference relation Pi and respects common
belief in the events that types believe in sequential rationality, satisfy Bayesian updating and
initially believe in P. Hence, ti(si) ∈ T ∗i (P ). Since si is sequentially rational for ti, we have that
si ∈ S∗i (P ). We thus have shown that S∞i (P ) ⊆ S∗i (P ), which implies that DF∞i (u) ⊆ S∗i (P )
for all players i. This establishes the implication from (2) to (1), and completes the proof of this
theorem. ¥
7. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4.8. Let u1 be an arbitrary utility representation of P 1, and let the utility
functions u2 and u˜2 be as stated in the lemma. Let D(P 1, P 2) be the set of unordered pairs of
terminal nodes on which P 1 and P 2 disagree. Similarly, we define D(P 1, P˜ 2). Without loss of
generality, let a and b in the lemma be chosen such that u1(a) > u1(b). Then, by construction,
u2(a) < u2(b) and u˜2(a) > u˜2(b). We prove our result through a series of smaller facts. The
proof for each of these facts is given in the lines immediately following the statement of the fact.
Fact 1. It holds that {a, b} /∈ D(P 1, P˜ 2), but {a, b} ∈ D(P 1, P 2).
This follows directly from the observation that u1(a) > u1(b), u˜2(a) > u˜2(b) but u2(a) < u2(b).
Fact 2. Let {x, y} ∈ D(P 1, P˜ 2), and x, y /∈ {a, b}. Then, {x, y} ∈ D(P 1, P 2).
This follows directly from the observation that u˜2(x) = u2(x) and u˜2(y) = u2(y).
Fact 3. Let {a, y} ∈ D(P 1, P˜ 2) such that u˜2(y) > u˜2(a). Then, {a, y} ∈ D(P 1, P 2).
Since {a, y} ∈ D(P 1, P˜ 2) and u˜2(a) < u˜2(y), we must have that u1(a) > u1(y). On the other
hand, by construction of u˜2, we know that u2(a) = u˜2(b) and u2(y) = u˜2(y). Since u˜2(y) > u˜2(a)
and u˜2(a) > u˜2(b), it follows that u2(a) = u˜2(b) < u˜2(y) = u2(y), which implies that {a, y} ∈
D(P 1, P 2).
Fact 4. Let {a, y} ∈ D(P 1, P˜ 2) such that u˜2(a) > u˜2(y) > u˜2(b). Then, {b, y} ∈ D(P 1, P 2).
Since {a, y} ∈ D(P 1, P˜ 2) and u˜2(a) > u˜2(y), we must have that u1(a) < u1(y). By assumption,
u1(a) > u1(b), and hence u1(b) < u1(y). By definition of u˜2, we have that u2(b) = u˜2(a) and
u2(y) = u˜2(y). Since u˜2(a) > u˜2(y), we have that u2(b) > u2(y), which implies that {b, y} ∈
D(P 1, P 2).
Fact 5. Let {a, y} ∈ D(P 1, P˜ 2) such that u˜2(y) < u˜2(b). Then, {a, y} ∈ D(P 1, P 2).
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As u˜2(y) < u˜2(b) and u˜2(a) > u˜2(b), we may conclude that u˜2(a) > u˜2(y). Since {a, y} ∈
D(P 1, P˜ 2) we must have that u1(a) < u1(y). By definition of u˜2, it is seen that u2(y) = u˜2(y)
and u2(a) = u˜2(b).As u˜2(b) > u˜2(y), it follows that u2(a) > u2(y), and hence {a, y} ∈ D(P 1, P 2).
Fact 6. Let {b, y} ∈ D(P 1, P˜ 2) such that u˜2(y) > u˜2(a). Then, {b, y} ∈ D(P 1, P 2).
As u˜2(b) < u˜2(a) < u˜2(y), and {b, y} ∈ D(P 1, P˜ 2), we must have that u1(b) > u1(y). By
definition of u˜2, it holds that u2(b) = u˜2(a) and u2(y) = u˜2(y). Since u˜2(a) < u˜2(y), we know
that u2(b) < u2(y), and hence {b, y} ∈ D(P 1, P 2).
Fact 7. Let {b, y} ∈ D(P 1, P˜ 2) such that u˜2(a) > u˜2(y) > u˜2(b). Then, {a, y} ∈ D(P 1, P 2).
As u˜2(b) < u˜2(y) and {b, y} ∈ D(P 1, P˜ 2), we may conclude that u1(b) > u1(y). Since u1(a) >
u1(b), it follows that u1(a) > u1(y). On the other hand, we know by definition of u˜2 that
u2(a) = u˜2(b) and u2(y) = u˜2(y). As u˜2(b) < u˜2(y), it follows that u2(a) < u2(y), and hence
{a, y} ∈ D(P 1, P 2).
Fact 8. Let {b, y} ∈ D(P 1, P˜ 2) such that u˜2(y) < u˜2(b). Then, {b, y} ∈ D(P 1, P 2).
Since u˜2(b) > u˜2(y) and {b, y} ∈ D(P 1, P˜ 2), it must be the case that u1(b) < u1(y). By con-
struction of u˜2, it holds that u2(b) = u˜2(a) and u2(y) = u˜2(y). As u˜2(a) > u˜2(b) > u˜2(y), we
have that u2(b) > u2(y), and hence {b, y} ∈ D(P 1, P 2).
From Facts 1 to 8, it follows that D(P 1, P˜ 2) contains strictly less pairs than D(P 1, P 2), and
hence d(P 1, P˜ 2) < d(P 1, P 2). This completes the proof. ¥
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